THE RISE AND FALL OF PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONISM:
WHAT NEXT FOR THE NLRA?
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In this Article, we ask whether the National Labor Relations Act, enacted over 70
years ago, can remain relevant in a competitive economy where nonunion employer
discretion is the dominant form of workplace governance. The best opportunity for
the NLRA’s continued relevance is the modification of its language and
interpretation to enhance worker voice and participation in the nonunion private
sector, without imposing undue costs on employers. Examples of such reforms
include narrowing the NLRA’s company union prohibition; implementing a
conditional deregulation system that relies on consent by an independent employee
association; changing the labor law default to some form of a nonunion work group;
expanding state and local authority over labor relations; and encouraging NLRA
protection for employee use of employer-owned Internet services. These legal
innovations have the potential to be welfare enhancing, as compared to outcomes
likely to evolve under the current legal framework. Although the political likelihood
of such changes is currently low, steps in this direction could result in an increased
relevance for the NLRA in the modern economy.
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”) of 19351 provided the legal
framework that ushered in union organizing, collective bargaining, and a sharp rise in private
sector unionism in the United States during the early and mid-twentieth century. Since that time,
the role and relevance of the NLRA has narrowed as private sector union density has eroded.2 In
today’s competitive environment, the dominant form of workplace governance lacks the
presence of a union; it is a governance structure under which management has unilateral, albeit
constrained, discretion with respect to most aspects of the workplace. This dominance is so
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complete that reforms in the NLRA cannot restore traditional unionism to its previous level.
Designed for a different era and type of workplace, the NLRA’s 1930s vision of bargaining
relationships has limited relevance today. One result of this transformation is an unmet desire of
many nonunion workers for opportunities to express individual and collective voice in
cooperation with their employers, albeit in a form different from what exists in most traditional
union establishments.
This Article explores changes in labor law and public policy that might satisfy this unmet
desire by promoting welfare-enhancing worker voice, participation, and cooperation in the
United States labor market, in particular for nonunion private sector workers.3 Underlying this
assessment of possible regulatory change is the reality that in today’s competitive environment,
the dominant form of employee governance is one in which management has unilateral
discretion with respect to most aspects of the workplace environment, albeit constrained by
societal norms and the need for employers to attract and retain capable employees. This reality
is reflected in the declining fortunes of traditional private sector unionism—a decline that does
not look to be reversed in today’s increasingly competitive economic environment.
Most labor reforms, including some discussed here, were originally proposed with the
intent of either encouraging or discouraging traditional unionism. Our concern, however, is not
with the promotion of an arguably out-dated model of collective representation. Rather, our
analysis recognizes that traditional unionism will remain a small part of the economy’s private
sector and focuses on reforms that, given this fact, are welfare enhancing for society as a whole.
The focus of this Article’s proposals, therefore, is to facilitate welfare-enhancing employee voice
and participation in an economy where few private sector employees will be represented by
3
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traditional unions.
We use the term “welfare enhancing” to indicate that the societal benefits from a change
exceed its costs, with benefits and costs interpreted broadly to include nonmonetary as well as
monetary effects. Of course, reliable estimation of the benefits and costs associated with labor
regulations is exceedingly difficult.4 Therefore, while we cannot state with certainty that our
proposals would be successful, they represent promising opportunities to enhance overall welfare
by expanding worker voice and cooperation without imposing undue costs on—and perhaps
providing benefits to—employers.
The need for welfare-enhancing labor reform is well-illustrated by the contrast between
the NLRA’s policies and antiquated view of the workplace, and the workplace as it currently
exists. The original version of the NLRA was enacted in 1935 as the Wagner Act. A key goal of
the Act was to promote national commerce, which had faced major disruptions due to labor
unrest,5 by “protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment.”6 The Wagner Act’s endorsement of collective action7 was
tempered by the Taft-Hartley Act’s amendments to the NLRA in 1947. Although not mutually
exclusive with the purposes of the Wagner Act, the Taft-Hartley amendments emphasized,
among other things, the goal of protecting employee free choice—specifically the choice not to
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seek collective representation.8 The resulting NLRA, therefore, has a strong aim to promote and
protect employees’ ability to freely choose whether or not to engage in collective action or
representation. This policy goal is not limited to choices about traditional unionism, however.
Collective action may take many forms, and employees’ freedom to choose unconventional
means to exercise their collective rights is firmly within the protection of the Act.9
The NLRA’s statutory language is vague enough to protect, at least theoretically, everchanging forms of collective action—even forms found in a modern workplace that are vastly
different from what existed in 1935. Many manufacturing jobs have been replaced by positions
that stress service or intellectual skills.10 The strict hierarchy that once existed in most
workplaces has eroded as many businesses seek flexibility, information sharing, and more
decentralized management.11 Although the broad scope of the NLRA’s language is generally
capable of taking these changes into account, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or
“Board”), the agency that enforces the NLRA, has been surprisingly reluctant to support these
changes. Some of the NLRA’s provisions are beyond the Board’s control, however, and several
have become obsolete or even detrimental in the contemporary economy.12 Thus, both flexible
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enforcement and statutory changes in the NLRA are warranted.
Part I of this Article examines the rise and fall of private sector unionism in the U.S. and
addresses the reasons that managerial discretion, rather than union-negotiated agreements, has
emerged as the dominant form of workplace governance. Part II explores private sector workers’
desire for more voice and cooperation in the workplace and describes ways in which that desire
may be satisfied. Finally, Part III evaluates several labor regulations changes that may be
welfare enhancing, providing greater opportunities for employee voice and participation while
being economically sustainable in a competitive economic environment.
I.

IS THE NLRA RELEVANT IN TODAY’S WORKPLACE?
A.

Private Sector Unionism in Decline

It is undisputed that unionism in the private sector has long been in decline. Private
sector union density13 was about one-in-three workers in the early 1950s, falling to nearly onein-five workers by the end of the 1970s.14 Although the number of private sector workers
climbed from 66.1 million to 105.5 million workers between 1977 and 2005, union membership
declined from 14.34 million to 8.26 million.15 This translates into a union membership density
decrease from 21.7% (or 23.3% covered by a collective-bargaining agreement) in 1977 to only
7.8% (8.5% covered) in 2005.16 Particularly sharp declines occurred in sectors highly organized
in the past. Between 1977 and 2005, membership density fell from 35.5% (37.6% covered) to
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13.0% (13.7% covered) in manufacturing and from 35.9% (37.6% covered) to 13.1% (13.8%
covered) in construction.17 It is difficult to identify any large industry in which private sector
union density has not diminished.
Nor has private sector unionization ended its decline. Union density is affected by flows
in and out of “stocks” of union and nonunion employment. In any given year, large numbers of
union and nonunion jobs are lost and large numbers of mostly nonunion jobs are created. For
density to remain constant in a growing economy, union organizing of existing and new
nonunion jobs, plus employment increases in already-unionized companies, must exceed the
number of union jobs lost. Organizing since the early 1980s has fallen well short of the
conditions to hold density constant; thus, the steady-state private sector density is likely to be
below its current level of 7.8%.18
The reasons for declining unionism are many and well known. Important, but hardly
sufficient, are structural changes that have reallocated jobs toward industries, occupations, and
locations that are typically less unionized. A significant factor leading to these changes has been
technological advances that reduce the need for labor in production jobs and in occupations
where job tasks are routinized and programmable (e.g., elevator operators in an earlier era; travel
agents today).19 This rapid productivity growth has been particularly evident in manufacturing,
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where increasing output has been accompanied by lower employment.20 Moreover, the NLRA
organizing process has proven costly and difficult for unions, due in no small part to often fierce
management opposition.21 Such resistance reflects, in part, an increasingly competitive domestic
and international economy,22 coupled with union wage premiums that have shown surprisingly
modest declines.23
Unenthusiastic worker, public, and employer sentiment for unions in this highlycompetitive world is the ultimate constraint, limiting not only the ability to organize, but also
adoption of union-friendly public policy and workplace norms.24 Sentiment for unions may also
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have been dampened by government mandates and regulations that affect all workplaces; such
legislation may act more as a substitute than a complement for collective bargaining.25 Changes
in the interpretation and enforcement of the NLRA since the 1980s—when Republican
administrations led to a more anti-union NLRB—have not enhanced organizing, but can explain
little of the decline. Private-sector union density decreased throughout the Clinton years and its
more labor-friendly NLRB.26
Absent a sharp and unlikely shift by workers and voters from individualistic to
collectivist attitudes,27 or a more broad shift in U.S. economic policy from a competitive to a
corporatist orientation,28 a resurgence in traditional private sector unionism is unlikely. Thus,
employees’ demand for greater workplace voice and cooperation29 will not be satisfied by
NLRA-style collective bargaining. This leads to questions about the NLRA’s continued
relevance and whether other forms of employee representation and participation will develop.
B.

Managerial Discretion or Contractual Governance: Which Works Best?

How relevant is the NLRA for workers in the current U.S. labor market? Apart from its
role in governing the union organizational and electoral process, the NLRA’s role in nonunion
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workplaces, which cover over 90% of private sector employment, is modest.30 Even for firms
that could face union organizing campaigns, the NLRA’s relevance has waned, as today’s
workplaces no longer match the work environment envisioned by the Act’s architects.
Implicit in the NLRA is a hierarchal view of management, in which workplaces have topdown control moving from managers to workers who have minimal discretion or decisionmaking authority. This characterization may have been defensible during the NLRA’s formative
years, but not today. Traditional union governance regularizes and codifies worker tasks within
a top-down command structure. In contrast, modern workplaces typically require interaction and
two-way communications between workers and supervisors, accompanied by the use of bottomup worker and managerial discretion that takes advantage of site-specific information.31 In
contemporary workplaces, job hierarchies are often not clear-cut and worker decision-making is
essential at most levels.32
In addition, the current dominant governance structure in the private sector is not
traditional unionization, but employer-fiat personnel systems in which outcomes are determined
by some combination of employer norms, governmental regulation, and the incentives and
constraints produced by market forces. The principal market constraints derive from competition
in capital and labor markets. For the firm to survive over the long run, it must earn a competitive
return on capital, preventing an employer from paying its workers a wage in excess—or, at least,
well in excess—of the value they generate for the firm. In order to attract and retain capable
30
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employees, however, workers must expect to receive compensation similar to, or in excess of,
what they could receive in alternative employment opportunities. Subject to these economic
constraints—as well as governmental limits on actions involving discrimination, minimum pay,
hours of work, safety, and the like33—nonunion employers are free to dictate wages and
workplace governance methods. If a wage and governance regime is costly relative to the value
of output, the employer will suffer losses. If wages are too low or the work environment too
harsh, the firm cannot attract and retain sufficient numbers of workers to operate and survive.
For enterprises operating between these upper and lower bounds, nonunion employer fiat has
proven to be a more dominant governance structure than collective bargaining contracts.
Michael Wachter identifies several factors in labor-contracting relationships that are
critical for all firms, union and nonunion, and that help to explain the current dominance of
nonunion governance structures.34 Wachter argues that the predominance of nonunion firms is
primarily the result of low transaction costs, coupled with nonunion firms’ ability to deal
effectively with match-specific investments, asymmetric information, and risk bearing.
Although unionized firms can handle these latter three factors through formal contracting,
nonunion companies manage these factors without the use of explicit contracts, sometimes more
and sometimes less effectively than if they were unionized. More significant is the disadvantage
that union companies face due to high transaction costs.
Match-specific investments refer to the time and money necessary to create and maintain
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a work relationship. These investments result in workers becoming more valuable to their
current employer (relative to other employers) as the worker gains job-specific skills and the
parties become adept at dealing with each other.35 A problem associated with match-specific
investments is the possibility of hold-up; once a party makes such investments, the other party
can behave opportunistically and capture ex post quasi-rents.36 One solution is for workers and
firms to jointly invest in firm-specific skills that create self-enforcing agreements that give both
parties an interest in continuing the relationship rather than losing their investment.37
Opportunistic behavior by nonunion employers is also constrained by concern for their
reputation among potential workers.38
Asymmetric information involves differences in the ability of the parties to monitor
certain aspects of the job or firm, creating a risk that the advantaged party will behave
opportunistically.39 For example, firms possess information on product demand superior to that
of workers, thereby providing firms the opportunity to misstate market conditions to gain an
advantage in workplace negotiations.40 A result of the product-demand asymmetry has been the
widespread norm under which firms rarely adjust wages downward, but are relatively free to
35

Id. at 167.
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to capture by, for example, threatening to end the work relationship unless they receive a larger share of profits. Id.
As Wachter notes, match-specific investments generally benefit both employers and employees; thus, the parties,
and society, would be better off if parties could make match-specific investments without the risk of the other party
attempting to capture any rents that result after the initial investments are made. Id.
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and development, among union firms).
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40
Id.
36
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adjust employment levels.41 This self-enforcing mechanism helps to diminish opportunistic use
of the information asymmetry by eliminating the incentive to understate the true level of demand
in order to justify a decrease in wages.42 Employers lack incentive to misstate demand with
regard to employment levels because they do not want to cut employment if demand is strong.43
In unionized workplaces, a similar but more formal arrangement exists, where most collectivebargaining agreements allow employment level, but not wage, adjustments absent negotiation.
Unions may grant employer requests for wage concessions, but generally only if financial
records are disclosed to union representatives.44
Risk bearing is another major problem in the employment relationship. Because most
workers have incomes tied to their jobs, they are in a poor position to bear company-specific
earnings risk that could result in fewer hours, lower wages and benefits, or job loss.45 Investors,
in contrast, can readily diversify investments and bear such risk. This difference in the ability to
tolerate risk may cause problems, as workers’ compensation and wealth are tied to factors out of
their control. More efficient risk bearing would insulate workers’ compensation from variances
in firm revenue and profit.46 Consequently, both union and nonunion workplaces tend to have
relatively fixed wage rates.47 In union companies, such rates are usually required under a
collective bargaining agreement, and in nonunion companies there is a largely self-enforcing
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implicit contract or norm of fixed wages, with employer reputation playing a key enforcement
role.
The principal advantage of nonunion pay and governance determination over union
agreements is not from the above factors, but rather from transaction costs.48 Because new
information is constantly coming to a firm and its workers, it is prohibitively costly to have
explicit contract terms for every possible contingency. Although many collective bargaining
agreements have broad management rights clauses,49 a unionized company’s formalized
contractual governance structure limits management’s and workers’ flexibility and discretion.
Revising contractual terms via the collective bargaining process is difficult and costly.50 By the
same token, the inability to revise the employer-employee relationship in response to external
market changes is also costly, all the more so in today’s rapidly changing and highly competitive
economic environment.
Ultimately, the workplace choice between informal nonunion governance—that is,
employer fiat—and formal union governance should depend on the answers to two questions.
First, does management discretion or union governance better handle the contractual problems
found in all workplaces—match specific-specific investments, asymmetric information, risk, and
transaction costs? For example, if management can behave opportunistically and appropriate
quasi-rents from immobile workers with little loss in firm reputation or worker productivity, then
a formalized union contractual relationship becomes attractive. To the extent that unions can and
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As Wachter notes, transaction costs are exacerbated in the face of more match-specific investments and
information asymmetries, as the need to regulate a higher potential for opportunistic behavior is more costly. See
Wachter, supra note 34, at 170.
49
See, e.g., St. George’s Warehouse, Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 904, 907, 927 (2004) (finding employer’s proposal for
broad management rights clause—which would allow it complete discretion over hiring; promotions; discipline for
cause; demotions; transfers; layoffs; recalls; setting productivity standards; contracting with third-parties to supply
personnel; closing, expanding, or relocating its facility; ceasing any job; and changing methods of operation—to be
lawful).
50
See Wachter, supra note 34, at 170.
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do behave opportunistically by appropriating quasi-rents from shareholders to acquire wage
premiums, then the union form becomes less attractive. The second question is how competitive
and dynamic are product and resource markets? Where changes in technology, product markets,
and financial markets are rapid, the costs of inflexibility in a formalized environment are more
severe. In such an environment, the greater discretion and flexibility associated with nonunion
governance are distinct advantages.
We contend that sectoral and technological changes, coupled with rising competition in
the U.S. and world economies,51 increasingly tilt labor-contracting preferences toward nonunion
governance. Outside of today’s formalized union sector, most workers are employed in firms
where workplace governance is subject to substantial management discretion. That discretion is
influenced by societal norms and constrained by governmental regulations. At least as
important, competition for employees requires that companies provide sufficient compensation
and acquire a reputation that will enable them to attract, motivate, and maintain a productive
work force.52
In today’s economy, union governance has proven to be an expensive minority model.
The disadvantage of traditional unionism is most apparent in the effect of unions on profitability,
investment, growth, and other aspects of firm performance, where improvements in productivity
fail to offset the costs of union wage premiums.53 Any profitability gap between union and
nonunion firms is sure to fuel and maintain strong management opposition to union organizing.54
As long as there is a gap in firm performance, managerial discretion will remain the dominant
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See supra notes 10-11, 20-23.
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See Hirsch, Economic Performance, supra note 38, at 431-34.
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There is some circularity here. No doubt much of management opposition to unions is the result of higher per unit
costs and less management discretion. But a hostile attitude by management toward unions also makes it less likely
one will see an enhancement in performance owing to cooperation and collective voice within union companies.
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form of workplace governance.
The dominance of managerial discretion over contractual governance suggests that the
future labor relations environment will look much like it does today, with no resurgence of
unionization on the horizon—at least traditional unions in the style envisaged by the NLRA. In
the following section, we identify alternative paths that might lead to workplace gains in a world
in which traditional collective governance continues to lose relevance. The NLRA, however,
still retains some significance, for both better and worse. Under the alternatives proposed here,
the Act could enjoy increased relevance by fostering a new model of collective action that makes
society better off.
II.

UNFULFILLED DESIRES OF PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYEES
A.

What Workers Want

The purpose of this Article is to outline alternative paths that, although not politically
likely, could lead to workplace gains in a world where private sector unionism remains limited.
To assess what gains may be possible, we begin by asking what workers want. Labor reforms
should address the concerns of workers, while taking into account their impact on employers and
the economy, such as investment and job creation. Worker concerns, at least to the extent they
touch on collective action, are expressly protected by the NLRA.55
In the early 1990s, the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations
(commonly known as the “Dunlop Commission”) administered the Worker Representation and
Participation Survey. The results of this survey, along with similar surveys in other countries,
are comprehensively analyzed by Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers in What Workers Want.56
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See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
Freeman & Rogers, supra note 21; see also Bruce E. Kaufman, The Employee Participation and Representation
Gap: An Assessment and Proposed Solution, 3 PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 491 (2001) (challenging conclusions drawn by
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The survey results paint a picture of significant unmet employee desires. First, many workers
want greater voice and participation in workplace decision-making, although they seek
individual voice as much as the collective right to be heard associated with traditional unions.57
Second, workers want a more cooperative and less adversarial worker-management relationship,
coupled with managerial support for entities that foster worker participation.58 Third, workers
want not just to express themselves, but also to have their views affect workplace outcomes in
meaningful ways.59 And fourth, workers see management resistance as the primary obstacle to
worker participation and cooperation.60 Despite some differences, the expressed desires and
concerns of workers are similar in union and nonunion workplaces.61
We draw several inferences from these results. One conclusion is that the current system
often leads to an underproduction of worker voice and participation, as well as workermanagement cooperation, in both union and nonunion workplaces.62 Moreover, the adversarial
relationship envisioned and reinforced by the NLRA does not appeal to workers. Finally, greater
voice and cooperation are unlikely to evolve from the current status quo. These inferences open
the door for potential societal gains through welfare-enhancing regulatory reforms.63
We identify four criteria by which labor regulation reforms should be evaluated, while
57

Freeman & Rogers, supra note 21, at 4-5, 147. Approximately 50 million employees (union and nonunion)
wanted more voice at work, while nearly one-third (15 million) of nonunion employees of all but the smallest
private sector firms wanted union representation and over 90% of unionized employees wanted to keep their union
representation. See Paul C. Weiler, A Principled Reshaping of Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century, 3 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 187, 197 (2001) [hereinafter, Weiler, A Principled Reshaping] (citing the Worker
Representation and Participation Survey).
58
Freeman & Rogers, supra note 21, at 5, 59, 141-42.
59
Id. at 4-5, 40-42. Freeman and Rogers note that the biggest gap in the amount of influence that employees want,
versus what they actually have, involves issues of benefits and pay, followed by training and, to a much smaller
degree, determining how and when to perform work. Id. at 51.
60
Id. at 5, 87. See Weiler, A Principled Reshaping, supra note 57, at 178 (2001) (noting that 79% of nonunion
employees said that employees visibly seeking unionization would very likely lose their jobs and 41% said that they
would personally lose their job if there were identified as being involved in a union campaign).
61
Freeman & Rogers, supra note 21, at 52.
62
See Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 177 (1989)
(comparing efficiency of labor regulations versus unregulated market outcomes).
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See infra Section III.
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recognizing that tradeoffs among the criteria may exist.64 First, proposals should be welfareenhancing for the parties and the economy.65 Second, reforms should facilitate enhanced voice
(including some freedom to choose whether and how to exercise that voice), encourage
cooperation and discourage costly conflict, and increase the flow of information within nonunion
workplaces. Third, any arrangement should constrain rent-seeking and opportunistic behavior by
workers and employers. Fourth, reforms should allow for variation across heterogeneous
workplaces and be flexible over time.
There are several paths that might encourage welfare-enhancing workplace governance.
We focus on nonunion workplaces, although what happens in the nonunion sector will affect
outcomes in the union sector. By “nonunion,” however, we include ventures sponsored by
unions that do not follow the traditional union form. Indeed, we anticipate that unions will be an
important catalyst for new workplace governance structures, with such innovations taking on an
increasingly significant role as long as union density remains low. Accordingly, we propose
alternatives that reduce legal impediments to nontraditional forms of workplace governance, with
the hope that these labor law and employment regulation reforms can provide at least modest
social welfare gains. Before discussing these alternatives, however, we identify some recent
workplace governance innovations that may establish the foundation for the future of private
sector collective action.
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For example, under certain circumstances, increasing worker voice while limiting rent-seeking behavior among
workers may be mutually exclusive.
65
Welfare-enhancing reform is defined at supra notes 4 and accompanying text. The value to the parties of an
“enterprise” can be defined as the sum of shareholder profits plus worker rents (the excess of compensation over
opportunity costs). See John M. Abowd, The Effect of Wage Bargains on the Stock Market Value of the Firm, 79
AM. ECON. REV. 774, 777 (1989) (developing and applying this definition of an enterprise).
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B.

What Workers Get

The vast majority of private sector workers will never have an opportunity to engage in
collective voice and participation via traditional unionism.66 Yet, despite legal hurdles to
nontraditional workplace governance schemes,67 the use of innovative work groups68 is
developing rapidly. No doubt due to their recent lack of success at gaining members,69
traditional unions have been at the forefront of developing new and different ways to reach and
serve the interests of workers. Whether these innovations are intended solely to boost traditional
union membership, or are merely a reflection of unions’ concern for workers, they represent
potentially vital tools for providing real voice and participation to nonunion private sector
employees. Although the use of welfare-enhancing work groups is growing, they face legal
obstacles and reach only a small percentage of private-sector employees; thus, labor reforms
should seek to further encourage their development.
Unions increasingly seek to organize workers outside the typical NLRA election
process.70 One popular technique is to organize workers around issues other than those directly
implicating workplace concerns. The Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”), for
example, successfully organized janitors in Santa Clara County, California despite significant
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See supra Section I.A.
See infra Sections III.A, III.E.
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We refer to “work groups” broadly as any entity in which employees participate and that serves some interest of
employees. This use is similar to the “employee involvement” programs that Freeman and Rogers define as
including such disparate entities as quality circles, discussion groups, total quality management groups, self-directed
work teams, safety committees, production committees, holiday part committees, and other small groups that work
on certain issues. See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 21, at 101.
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See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
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employees who signed cards in support of the union. See Employee Free Choice Act, S. 842; H.R. 1696. The bill
would require employers to recognize a union that obtains majority support from employees via a “card-check”
(cards signed by employees stating that they want the union to represent them). Surprisingly, a majority of House
members—in a Republican-majority House—have already signed on to the bill as co-sponsors. See Majority of
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hurdles that included the mostly Mexican immigrant workers’ low English language and job
skills.71 The SEIU’s success was based in large part on a campaign centered on Mexican culture
that involved religious and political leaders, and used publicity techniques that included
demonstrations and boycotts against the high-tech companies such as Apple Computer that hired
the cleaning contractors employing the janitors.72 As union density levels remain low, unions are
likely to increase their use of such innovative strategies. Indeed, the 2005 split in the AFL-CIO
was prompted by the belief of the SEIU and other major unions joining the Change To Win
Coalition that the AFL-CIO’s organizing efforts were too conservative.73 Attempts at innovative
organizing have also led to the formation of work groups that do not act as traditional unions, but
provide an opportunity for voice that many workers want.
These nontraditional work groups include a growing trend by unions forming affiliate
organizations that do not deal with employers on behalf of their members. For example, the
AFL-CIO’s “Working America” affiliate consists of members who are associated with labor
generally, but are not formally represented by a union.74 Its main purpose has been to encourage
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See Stone, supra note 10, at 225 (describing Justice for Janitors campaign and other nontraditional union
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Unions, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 493, 497 (2002) [hereinafter Hyde, Employee Organization].
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DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA), July 26, 2006, at AA-1.
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Fortunes 17 (National Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11298, 2005), available at
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action on local and national political issues; yet, its potential to activate members for other
projects is significant.75 For example, Working America recently created a web site that contains
a database with information on over 60,000 companies, including executive compensation,
overseas outsourcing, and labor and employment violations.76 This type of information may be
valuable to workers, arguably reducing information asymmetries and, in some cases, the
employer opportunistic behavior such asymmetries allow.77
Another interesting example of the increasingly blurry line between traditional unionism
and less formal work groups is the alliance between the AFL-CIO and the National Day Laborer
Organizing Network (“NDLON”). In announcing their alliance, the groups expressed their intent
to form a National Worker Center Partnership, which would further support community-based
entities called “worker centers” that act as advocates for nonunion workers and provide a large
range of services to enhance both collective and individual voice.78 Worker centers already have
a significant presence in the U.S., with over 140 centers in 31 states.79
These new work groups aptly show how employee voice can be satisfied through
alternative institutions and that such institutions can be transformed and evolve over time. The
Communication Workers of America’s (“CWA”) “WashTech” affiliate, for instance,
transformed from a nonbargaining entity to one that sought formal bargaining status and
ultimately led to the creation of several entirely different work groups. The CWA initially
formed WashTech only to assist, and lobby on behalf of, Microsoft independent contractors and
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temporary help agency workers, but it has begun to seek recognition on behalf of some
technology workers—and even obtained card check recognition from one employer.80
Washtech’s success prompted the CWA to form a national website for all technology workers,
and other unions have followed suit.81
The examples above illustrate the possibility of providing services to workers through
innovative organizations not directly tied to the workplace—that is, outside the traditional
collective bargaining process. Although these groups have potential, they will not necessarily
flourish or become widespread. Such efforts are costly both in the initial and ongoing stages,
and the union and philanthropic foundation funds needed to support these groups are limited.
Monies will flow to these organizations only if they provide benefits greater than alternative uses
of scarce funds.
More fundamentally, as pointed out by Joni Hersch, there is a basic tension in such
organizations that may limit their development.82 Hersch asks whether a large interest group not
attached to the workplace can successfully provide services to workers and lobby for their wellbeing. Hersch examines in some detail the experience of Working Today, which began as a
group broadly focused on services and lobbying for independent workers, but evolved into a
group claiming an overriding social agenda, while focusing more narrowly on making benefits
portable across jobs.83 Generalizing from this analysis, Hersch models a group that provides
services, lobbies, and represents members. Tension arises because the organization provides a
good that is partly public—that is, its benefits spill over to nonmembers. It must attract members
80
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based on the private goods it provides, while raising money from foundations or large entities
interested in the public outcome.84 The implication drawn by Hersch is that there is no common
blueprint for such an organization—different types of groups can and will arise. But their
success and growth is not guaranteed.
As described in more detail below,85 work groups can provide a diverse set of services for
workers and satisfy to some degree the desire for workplace voice and participation. The NLRA,
however, has not been hospitable to these nontraditional work groups, effectively reducing the
choice set for most workers to either traditional unions or management discretion (albeit
constrained), with little in between.86 What follows, therefore, are proposals to make the NLRA
more open to welfare-enhancing innovations that facilitate worker voice, participation, and
cooperation in the workplace, in particular for private sector nonunion workers.
III.

ENCOURAGING WORKER VOICE AND PARTICIPATION IN NONUNION WORKPLACES
A.

Reforming the NLRA’s “Company Union” Prohibition

Any discussion of expanding the development of nontraditional work groups must focus
on the NLRA’s broad “company union” prohibition. This prohibition, as currently interpreted by
the NLRB, severely limits employers’ ability to lawfully establish work groups that may provide
welfare-enhancing employee voice and participation. Accordingly, we propose a legislative
modification that would significantly reduce the number and types of groups that fall under the
84
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company union ban.
In its attempt to prevent employer-controlled unions via Section 8(a)(2) and, by inclusion,
Section 2(5),87 the NLRA also limits less formal employer-sponsored work groups—even those
that do not bargain on behalf of employees. Section 8(a)(2) prohibits employer domination or
support for any labor organization.88 Section 2(5) defines a “labor organization” as any entity in
which employees participate and which has a purpose to deal with employers over grievances,
disputes, wages, pay rates, hours of employment, or work conditions.89
The legitimate goals underlying Section 8(a)(2)’s inclusion in the 1935 Wagner Act
include an attempt to prevent employer-dominated work groups that would interfere with
employees’ freedom to choose an independent, traditional union and to bar representation that,
because of ties to employers, was viewed as inherently flawed.90 The fear that employers may
create entities that interfere with employees’ choice whether or not to seek collective
representation led to Section 2(5)’s broad definition of “labor organization,” which the Board
subsequently expanded further.91
The Board has concluded that it will classify an entity as a labor organization under
87
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Section 2(5) if “1) employees participate, 2) the organization exists, at least in part, for the
purpose of ‘dealing with’ employers, and 3) these dealings concern ‘conditions of work’ or
concern other statutory subjects [listed in Section 2(5)], such as grievances, labor disputes,
wages, rates of pay, or hours of employment.”92 The current expansive reach of Section 2(5),
and by extension Section 8(a)(2), results in large part from the Board’s interpretation of “dealing
with.” According to the Board, an entity is “dealing with” an employer wherever there is a
“bilateral mechanism involving proposals from [an] employee committee concerning the subjects
listed in Sec[tion] 2(5), coupled with real or apparent consideration of those proposals by
management.”93 In particular, “dealing” is present if there is a “pattern or practice in which a
group of employees, over time, makes proposals to management, management responds to these
proposals by acceptance or rejection by word or deed, and compromise is not required.”94 The
Board has broadly interpreted this definition to cover entities with no formal structure, even if
they have no elected officers, by-laws, regular meetings, or dues and do not engage in anything
close to collective bargaining.95 Any employer support or control over such an organization—
for instance, creating the group or running its meetings—violates Section 8(a)(2).96
The expansiveness of these provisions restricts development of nonunion vehicles for
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employer-employee cooperation and productivity-enhancing worker voice.97 This is because the
NLRA allows no middle ground—employees often must choose between traditional union
representation or no representation at all.98
One of many illustrations of the vast reach of the company union prohibition is the
Board’s decision in Grouse Mountain Lodge.99 The employer in that case operated a Montana
resort that was facing an organizing campaign.100 Among several unfair labor practices
occurring during the campaign, the Board found that the employer violated Section 8(a)(2)
because of its support for the “Quality Assurance (QA) Committee.”101 The QA Committee
consisted of a suggestion box and various meetings; all employees were invited to the meetings,
where they could offer ideas to management and discuss issues such as work conditions, guest
matters, and safety concerns.102 Although the QA Committee had no structural documents, bylaws, or procedures,103 the Board found that it was a labor organization. According to the Board,
the QA Committee satisfied the “dealing with” requirement, in part, because the employer
sought input from the committee about what should be served for employees’ free lunches and
which holiday they should designate as the new day providing overtime pay.104 It is difficult to
imagine how this type of employer-employee interaction interferes with employees’ labor rights.
Rather, this type of virtually structureless feedback is often indispensable to companies in the
modern economy. Yet, the Board’s current company union jurisprudence unjustifiably treats
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such beneficial interactions as unlawful.
The potential benefits of employer-supported work groups are widespread, although not
universal.105 In some cases, managers will enthusiastically adopt measures to enhance
opportunities for employee voice to take advantage of the production improvements and
increased job satisfaction gained from employee input; in other cases, managers will adopt such
measures by necessity to remain competitive in the marketplace.106 In sharp contrast to the
strictly hierarchical manufacturing model of the 1930s, such input is considerably more
important in the modern economy, where the need for workers to think and make suggestions is
much higher than when the NLRA was enacted.107 Employee work groups may also provide an
alternative to resolve workplace disputes that both employers and employees find more
beneficial than other methods.108 Employers that are open to more employee voice may also
discover that employees develop more loyalty and attachment to the firm.109
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Levine, supra note 11, at 63 (stating that “[m]any middle- and lower-level managers resist and sometimes sabotage
employee involvement . . . [because greater employee autonomy] may be threatening to supervisors and managers”).
107
See Barenberg, Democracy and Domination, supra note 72, at 885-90, 926 n. 826 (discussing numerous
examples of successful flexible work teams and citing studies showing improvement in productivity, quality, and
innovation from increased employee involvement); Estreicher, supra note 32, at 135-39 (describing importance of
“smart” workers who can fully understand the business, make use of new technologies, and make suggestions to the
employer).
108
See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 21, at 136-38 (discussing workplace committees that monitor labor
standards); Hyde, supra note 90, at 153-54 (describing advantages of work “caucuses” over other responses to work
grievances, such as quitting, internalizing complaints, or litigating).
109
See Clyde Summers, Employee Voice and Employer Choice: A Structured Exception to Section 8(a)(2), 69 CHI.KENT L. REV. 129, 135 (1993) (discussing the benefits of the “shared enterprise” model of employment in Germany
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Labor law reform that relaxed the Board’s current company union prohibition would
effectively expand choices for many employees. Employees who have little prospect for seeing
formal collective bargaining in their workplace would have the option to take part in a group that
provides some outlet for voice, while enjoying NLRA protection for their participation.
The possible gains from employer-supported work groups’ flexibility and ingenuity are
well-illustrated by the variety in the structure of the groups themselves. Avenues for employee
voice may arise from groups formed for nonproduction purposes, such as a diversity committee.
Moreover, other entities—such as work teams that concentrate on certain projects or production
issues, or groups that are focused on procedures, policies, or rules—can foster employee input
and feedback.110 It is not surprising, therefore, that studies have shown the use of some form of
employee work groups is reasonably widespread and growing.111
Although unions are concerned that employer-supported work groups might replace
them,112 it is also possible that the process of electing worker representatives or exercising voice

and Japan). The potential benefits of employer-run work groups have been recognized in other areas as well. For
example, a failed amendment to the Occupational Health and Safety Act would have required health and safety
committees in most workplaces. See H.R. 1280, 103rd Cong. (1993); H.R. 3160, 102nd Cong. (1991); see also
Estlund, supra note 2, at 1541 n.69 (stating that such groups can improve safety) (citing Gregory R. Watchman, Safe
and Sound: The Case for Safety and Health Committees Under OSHA and the NLRA, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
65, 82-89 (1994)); Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Representation Outside the Labor Act: Thoughts on Arbitral
Representation, Group Arbitration, and Workplace Committees, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 75, 91-96 (2002)
(discussing state legislation mandating workplace safety committees); Randy S. Rabinowitz & Mark M. Hager,
Designing Health and Safety: Workplace Hazard Regulation in the United States and Canada, 33 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 373, 431 (2000)).
110
See Estreicher, supra note 32, at 127 (describing production-focused groups as “on-line,” as distinguished from
nonproduction “off-line” groups).
111
See Bruce E. Kaufman, Does The NLRA Constrain Employee Involvement and Participation Programs in
Nonunion Companies?: A Reassessment, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 729, 747-53 (1999) (describing results of
various studies and noting that most of these groups are probably not affected by Section 8(a)(2)); Freeman &
Rogers, supra note 21, at 92 (describing reports that one-third of employees said their employer met with
committees of employees to resolve problems and over half said their employer had some form of an employee
involvement system); Levine, supra note 11, at 7 (citing study showing that in 1990, 88% of companies had at least
one worker involved with an employee-involvement program).
112
See Jonathon P. Hiatt & Laurence E. Gold, Employer-Employee Committees: A Union Perspective, in Kaufman
& Taras, supra note 90, at 507-08.
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in nonunion companies would complement the organization of traditional unions.113 Other
countries have much higher union density rates, even though they do not foreclose employerinitiated or -supported work groups that might engage in discussions over compensation and
working conditions. For example, employer-supported nonunion work groups are permitted and
not uncommon in Canada,114 where traditional unions and collective bargaining operate at levels
higher than in the U.S.115
Some countries, Germany being the prime example, mandate that some form of elected
employee work group be available to workers, a right that has now been adopted by the
European Union.116 German employers are often supportive of these “works councils,” finding
that a good working relationship with them is productive.117 More to the point, German works
councils are often closely tied to trade unions and have historically fed unions with new
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See Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong; Can We Fix It? 45 B.C. L. REV. 125,
145 (2003) (noting that the steel unions and National Education Association evolved in part from company unions);
Estlund, supra note 2 at 1545, 1551, 1601 (arguing that allowing some sort of employer work groups might spur
innovation among unions); Estreicher, supra note 32, at 153-54; Barenberg, Democracy and Domination, supra note
72, at 831-35 (discussing pre-NLRA company unions morphing into traditional, independent unions). But see
Freeman & Rogers, supra note 21, at 113-15 (describing survey results showing that workers at firms with employee
involvement programs have less interest in traditional unions, although noting that such programs do not lessen
support for union at unionized firm).
114
For a good history of Canada’s law in this area, see LeRoy, supra note 11, at 1669-73; see also Weiler, A
Principled Reshaping, supra note 57, at 199 n.44.
115
See Kaufman, Constrain, supra note 111, at 805-06 (arguing that Canadian union density of 34% is due, in part,
to independent unions co-opting employer-initiated work groups and a legal regime that better protects employee
free choice).
116
The European Union Charter contains a provision establishing a fundamental right of workers or their
representatives to information and consultation in the workplace. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union art. 27, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/unit/charte/en/chartersolidarity.html. Paul Weiler has suggested that the U.S. adopt basically the same requirements as Germany. See
Weiler, Governing the Workplace, supra note 8, at 282-95. Others have made similar suggestions. See, e.g.,
Summers, supra note 109, at 130-32; Hyde, supra note 90, at 152 & n.9; Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Who
Speaks For Us? Employee Representation in a Nonunion Labor Market, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION:
ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 14 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993) (suggesting
encouragement of such groups through government incentives).
117
See Summers, supra note 109, at 132 (noting that Japanese employers typically accept that country’s similar
“enterprise unions” as well); see also Levine, supra note 11, at 3-4, 115-21 (discussing widespread employeeinvolvement in Europe and Japan); Charles C. Heckscher, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE
CHANGING CORPORATION 177-231 (1988) (arguing for “associational unions” that exist to develop and enforce
agreements at a specific employer).
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members.118 It is true, however, that although activation of a works council is a simple process,
workers do not find it necessary to do so in a sizable share of German workplaces, and the recent
decline in works council members reinforces a slide in union membership.119 Further, China’s
government-sponsored union, which does not typically engage in collective bargaining, has done
what previously seemed impossible—convince Wal-Mart to voluntarily allow the union to
represent all of its employees in that country.120 It is not clear what influence the Chinese union
will have on Wal-Mart’s operations in that country. However, it is hard to imagine that having
Wal-Mart or other nonunion companies in the U.S. engage in discussions with worker
representatives will result in lower private sector union density than would otherwise exist.
This diversity of employer-supported worker participation schemes illustrates the ability
of work groups to adapt to the unique circumstances of a wide variety of companies, workers,
and societies. Such flexibility and innovation provide more promise for employee participation
and voice in the private sector than do traditional unions, although management and workers in
many establishments will not opt to implement vehicles for employee voice. We should see
adoption of employer-supported work groups where such activity has the greatest potential
benefit. These potential benefits from nonunion work groups are currently limited, to some
unknown degree, by the NLRA’s expansive company union prohibition. To the extent that
employer-supported work groups created as a result of NLRA reforms prove effective,
competitive pressures will induce their adoption by other companies. If ineffective, such reforms
will have little impact.
118

See John T. Addison, Claus Schnabel & Joachim Wagner, The (Parlous) State of German Unions 9 (IZA
Discussion Paper No. 2000, 2006), JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH (forthcoming), available at
www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/papers.
119
Id. (showing that in 2004, just one in ten German establishments had works councils in the private sector, which
included 47% of all employees in Western Germany and 38% in Eastern Germany; the significantly higher
employee- versus establishment-density resulting because works councils exist primarily at larger establishments).
In addition to declining union density, there also has been greater decentralization of bargaining. Id.
120
See David Barboza, Wal-Mart Agrees to Unionization in China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006.
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By making many of these groups unlawful—particularly the most effective ones, which
often involve substantial interactions between employees and management—the NLRA’s
company union ban has impeded the development of groups that could provide significant
improvement for workers, employers, society, and possibly even traditional unions.
Consequently, we support modification of the NLRA’s prohibition against employer-sponsored
work groups. A change that best reflects our four reform criteria121 would maintain restrictions
against company domination of traditional unions, while permitting the development in nonunion
companies of less formal work groups. These work groups would not participate in formal
collective bargaining, but could communicate with management and participate in workplace
discussions, including those regarding pay, grievances, and working conditions.
Our recommendation is to change Section 2(5)’s definition of labor organization to
include only those entities that have been certified by the Board, or recognized by an employer,
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of a unit of employees under Section 9 of
the NLRA.122 The modification would permit employers to create or maintain work groups that
discuss terms and conditions of employment, so long as those groups are not labor organizations
as defined by the revised Section 2(5).123 This offers employers virtually unfettered opportunity
to promote the sharing of information without the specter of a Section 8(a)(2) violation, while
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See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a), (c), (e) (stating Board’s certification process and authority to evaluate questions whether an
exclusive bargaining representative enjoys support from a majority of employees).
123
This proposal has similarities with a proposal made by Samuel Estreicher, see Estreicher, supra note 32, at 150
(proposing limiting Section 2(5)’s definition of labor organization to groups that “bargain with” employers over
terms and conditions of employment), and a House-passed Taft-Hartley bill in 1947, see H.R. Rep. No. 80-245, at
54 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 345 (1948)
(stating that it would not be an unfair labor practice for an employer to form or maintain “a committee of employees
and discussing with it matters of mutual interest, including [terms and conditions of work], if the Board has not
certified or the employer has not recognized a representative . . . under section 9”). This bill took care to allow
“discussions” without imposing a formal duty to “bargain” on the organization or the employer. See id.; LeRoy,
supra note 11, at 1704-05 (providing bill’s history). Indeed, the bill stated that Section 8(a)(2) would still bar an
employer from creating a formal organization with common characteristics of a labor union. See H.R. Rep. No. 8245, at 54.
122
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maintaining the major policy aims of that provision. Section 8(a)(2)’s goal of preventing
employers from coercing or misleading employees into thinking that they have independent
representation would be maintained, as employees would be well aware whether or not they are
represented by an independent union. Moreover, as is the case currently, an employer would still
be unable to discuss conditions of employment with its work group if there was already a union
on the scene.124
Unlike other proposals, such as the failed TEAM Act,125 which call for changes to the
definition of labor organization, the proposed modification ensures that non-Section 9 work
groups cannot take advantage of the protections that independent labor organizations enjoy under
the NLRA.126 For example, the certification, recognition, and contract bars—which preclude
124

Any attempt to deal with represented employees about terms and conditions of employment without going
through the union violates the employer’s duty to bargain under the NLRA and is considered unlawful “direct
dealing.” See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (making it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of its employees”); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684
(1944); Toledo Typographical Union No. 63 v. NLRB (Toledo Blade), 907 F.2d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
Estreicher, supra note 32, at 151-52
125
The “Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995,” H.R. 743, 104th Cong. (1995) (“TEAM Act”),
would have lowered restrictions on employer-sponsored workplace participation groups. The TEAM Act would
have created a proviso to Section 8(a)(2) stating that it is not unlawful:
for an employer to establish, assist, maintain, or participate in any organization or entity of any kind, in
which employees who participate to at least the same extent practicable as representatives of management
participate, to address matters of mutual interest, including, but not limited to, issues of quality,
productivity, efficiency, and safety and health, and which does not have, claim, or seek authority to be the
exclusive bargaining representatives of the employees or to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining
agreements with the employer or to amend existing collective bargaining agreements between the
employer and any labor organization, except . . . a case in which a labor organization is the representative
of such employees as provided in section 9(a).
Id. The House and Senate passed the TEAM Act, which Present Clinton then vetoed. See 142 Cong. Rec.
H8816 (1996).
126
One could also exclude groups created by employers to thwart organizing campaigns, see Estreicher, supra note
32, at 155; Summers, supra note 116, at 142 (arguing that a plan should not be allowed if an organizing campaign or
representation proceeding was pending), or where an employer had recently committed an unfair labor practice, see
Summers, supra note 116, at 142 (arguing for ban where unfair labor practice charge was pending or was found to
have been committed within the last three years); Hyde, supra note 90, at 190 (same). There have been many other
alternatives proposed as well. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 116, at 142-45 (proposing exceptions to Section
8(a)(2) for plans that, among other things, allow employees to modify plan’s structure, separate supervisors and nonsupervisors, allow employee-elected representatives, and require an employer to bargain); LeRoy, supra note 11, at
1708-09 (proposing that Section 8(a)(2) allow employers to create a group that discusses work conditions, but does
not claim or seek to be an exclusive bargaining representative); Weiler, A Principled Reshaping, supra note 57, at
200 (arguing that Section 8(a)(2) should ban only company-sponsored unions that collectively bargain, rather than
merely deal with the employer); Hyde, supra note 90, at 187-90 (arguing that “labor organization” should be defined
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rival unions from seeking to represent workers for a period of time after an incumbent union
becomes the employees’ representative127 or during much of the existence of a collectivebargaining agreement128—will not apply to these work groups. Thus, employers and employees
would be able to engage in information-sharing without fear of violating the NLRA.
Information-sharing would also be promoted by the clarity of the test—it is unmistakable,
ex ante, whether or not a group is a Section 2(5) labor organization.129 Employers that want to
establish a work group may do so without risk of a future Section 8(a)(2) violation. Importantly,
the modification favors neither traditional unionism nor employer-supported work groups;
employees who want representation by an independent union may still pursue that goal without
interference by the employer.130 This heightens employee choice and encourages competition
between unions and employers to fulfill employee demands.
Employer-supported work groups may also benefit from not being considered labor
organizations. Avoiding that designation frees a group from the risk of liability for unfair labor
practices under Section 8(b) of the NLRA131 and the reporting and disclosure requirements under

as any group that employees participate in and that “deals with”—to be broadly defined and including
communicating or exercising delegated management authority—employers concerning any condition of work, and
that an employer should be allowed to support a labor organization if approved by employees via secret ballot for a
specified time period); Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised To Preserve Industrial
Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 397, 420, 430-31 (1992) (proposing no Section 8(a)(2) violation unless employer
unilaterally establishes group with purpose of chilling or precluding organizing).
127
Under the certification bar, an incumbent union enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of majority status for
typically a year following certification; during that year, the Board will not order an election and the employer may
not withdraw recognition, even if another union claims to have majority support. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96,
98-104 (1958). Under the recognition bar, an incumbent union enjoys a irrebuttable presumption of majority status
for a “reasonable period” after being recognized by the employer as the employees’ representative. See Keller
Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 586-87 (1966).
128
Under the contract bar, an active collective bargaining agreement will inoculate the incumbent union from
challenges to its majority status for a maximum of three years. See Gen Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125
(1962).
129
See Summers, supra note 116, at 141 (stressing the need for “reasonably clear” line between lawful and unlawful
employee participation groups).
130
See Weiler, A Principled Reshaping, supra note 57, at 178 (stating that key interests in labor law “are those of
workers, rather than the unions who represent them or the companies who employ them”).
131
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (establishing “labor organization” unfair labor practices, such as restraints on picketing).
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the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”).132 Freedom from these laws
could help spur the growth of work groups by allowing them to develop outside of federal labor
restrictions133 Similarly, in order to keep regulatory and employer costs low, there would be few,
if any, legal requirements attached to the structure of employer-supported work groups. For
example, although many employers would designate that employee representatives be freely
elected, there would be no such requirement.134 Despite the lack of legal requirements, selfenforcing mechanisms would often advance employees’ interests, as work groups without strong
support from the workforce would have little credibility or effectiveness.
Current law hinders the flexibility and originality that could serve to fill a much-needed
niche for workers. By reducing the costs of creating nontraditional work groups, the proposal
would allow more workers to fulfill their desire for some form of representation or voice at
work. Moreover, because participation in these groups would generally be considered concerted
and protected activity under the NLRA, employers could not retaliate against or interfere with
such activity without violating the Act.135
At the same time that Congress amends Section 2(5) to encourage employer-supported
132

See id. §§ 430 (establishing LMRDA reporting and disclosure obligations), 439 (imposing fines or incarceration
for failing to file required reports under LMRDA); Hyde, New Institutions, supra note 74, at 522-23 (noting that
avoiding the need to service collective-bargaining agreements can save money). Note that the LMRDA’s definition
of labor organization is broader than the NLRA’s definition. 29 U.S.C. § 402(i) (defining “labor organization” as
“any organization of any kind, any agency, or employee representation committee, group, association, or plan so
engaged in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of
employment” and also including “any conference, general committee, joint or system board, or joint council so
engaged which is subordinate to a national or international labor organization, other than a State or local central
body”). Such groups would also avoid—perhaps less defensibly—the requirement to observe democratic processes
and a duty of fair representation to its members. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415, 481-504 (LMRDA democratic
requirements); Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. O’Neil, 499 U.S. 65, 74-78 (1991) (discussing duty of fair representation).
133
See Hyde, New Institutions, supra note 74, at 508 (discussing group, “ROC-NY,” that obtained contract on behalf
of some New York City restaurant workers that was expressly not collective bargaining agreement). However,
Hyde rightly questions whether ROC-NY would be able to avoid a finding that it was a labor organization if its
status was ever challenged. Id. at 509 n.31.
134
Subsequent discussions of conditional deregulation and a change in the labor law default each include the
requirement that work group representatives be freely elected. See supra Sections III.B, III.C.
135
See infra note 193.
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nonunion work groups, however, it should also adopt other changes to the NLRA that strengthen
the Board’s ability to remedy employer unfair labor practices or other inappropriate obstacles to
organizing. Employers are currently able to interfere with employees’ decision whether or not to
pursue collective representation with little cost. The lack of a significant penalty for interfering
with employees’ rights calls into question whether those rights have much value. Strengthening
the Board’s enforcement powers while also relaxing the company union ban would give
employers more freedom to establish work groups and, at the same time, provide better
protection of employees’ right to freely choose whether to participate in the employer-sponsored
group rather than a more independent form of collective activity.
One reform particular to the company union prohibition is to change current holdings that
refuse to consider a Section 8(a)(2) unfair labor practice as a “continuing violation.”136 The
result is that an employer can create and dominate a labor organization, sign a contract
“negotiated” with the organization, and—if not challenged within the NLRA’s 6-month statute
of limitations137—avoid any Section 8(a)(2) problems during the life of the contract.138 The
harm created by a contract negotiated with an employer-dominated labor organization should not
be permitted to continue simply because, as is often the case, no one was prepared to file a
Section 8(a)(2) charge at the time the contract was signed.139 Although this is not a widespread
problem, such a change is consistent with the philosophy of the Act and the reforms proposed in
this Article.

136

Sav-On Drugs, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 816, 824 n.19 (1980), enforced, 728 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Local
Lodge No. 1424, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists (Bryan Mfg. Co.) v. NLRB., 362 U.S. 411, 419-23 (1960) (holding that
Section 10(b)’s sixth-month statute of limitations bars challenge to lawfulness of execution of collective-bargaining
agreement and “continuing violation” theory is inapplicable if enforcement of agreement is not, by itself, unlawful).
137
29 U.S.C. § 160(b).
138
See Armored Transp., Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 143, 145, 148 (2001), enforcement denied on other grounds sub nom.
AT Sys. W., Inc. v. NLRB, 294 F.3d 136 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
139
Generally, Section 8(a)(2) charges are filed by independent unions that seek to represent a unit of employees only
to find an employer-sponsored labor organization already in place. See id. at 148.
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It is also important that employees’ right to choose independent union representation be
adequately protected. In this vein, Samuel Estreicher has identified the need to proscribe work
groups created in response to an organizing campaign, to strengthen protections against
retaliatory discharges, to increase union access to employees, and to decrease the incentive to
delay the representational process through litigation.140 Other changes could include permitting
private rights of action,141 increasing the use of injunctive relief,142 and accelerating elections.143
More generally, Congress needs to strengthen the Board’s limited remedial power.144 For
instance, although employer-dominated “sham” unions are not widespread, the Board’s sole
remedial power against even the most egregious Section 8(a)(2) violations is to post notices and
to disestablish such entities, neither of which is likely to dissuade employers committed to
creating them.145 Giving the Board enhanced authority to punish employer unfair labor
practices—particularly through monetary fines—would impose real costs that an employer must
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Estreicher, supra note 32, at 155.
Employers currently have the right, under Section 303 of the LMRA, to sue in federal court for damages caused
by union secondary boycotts. See 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (providing suit for damages caused by violation of Section
8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)). Providing a private right of action would also enhance nonunion
employees’ exercise of their right to pursue collective action. Few employees are aware that the NLRA applies in
the nonunion setting, and the NLRB could do more to advertise that fact. Private actions, particularly if attorney
fees and other damages were available, would drastically increase nonunion employees’ exercise of their NLRA
rights, thereby maintain the Act’s relevance in an economy that is overwhelmingly nonunion. See Estlund, supra
note 2, at 1555 (arguing that private right of action would provide more effective enforcement than currently exists
under the NLRA).
142
Cf. Weiler, A Principled Reshaping, supra note 57, at 189-90, 205 (arguing for quicker enforcement of
reinstatement orders through injunctive relief, expedited elections, and a ban on permanent replacement of strikers).
The Board General Counsel may seek injunctive relief against employer unfair labor practices pursuant to Section
10(j), but must seek such relief against union secondary boycotts under Section 10(l). See 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), (l).
143
See Kaufman, Constrain, supra note 111, at 800 (proposing maximum of four weeks between representation
petition and election); Craver, supra note 126, at 420 (proposing two week maximum). Other options, which are not
endorsed here, include mandated employer neutrality and card-check recognition, as the proposed Employee Free
Choice Act would require. See supra note 70.
144
Criticism of the Board’s limited remedial power has been widespread. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 2, at 153839 (citing other criticisms).
145
See Kaufman, Constrain, supra note 111, at 776-77 & n. 147 (describing management statements and NLRB
enforcement statistics indicating some employers run work groups that they know may be unlawful because of weak
penalties and low risk of a Section 8(a)(2) violation).
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take into account before attempting to interfere with employees’ rights under the Act.146
The current company union prohibition harms both employers who want more input from
their workers and employees who would like to provide such input, but do not want traditional
union representation.147 By removing the threat of a Section 8(a)(2) violation for employers that
value employee input, whether as a benefit to the firm or as a means to attract workers,148 the
proposed modification expands opportunities for worker voice and participation. It is difficult to
see how this expansion would be detrimental.149 Employees preferring an independent union can
still pursue that path. Employees who want enhanced voice but do not want a union, or are
employed at a firm where unionization is not a realistic possibility, would be better off if the
NLRA’s company union restriction were modified to allow more development of employersupported work groups.150
As noted, it is unlikely that weakening the company union prohibition would greatly
146

Cf. Weiler, A Principled Reshaping, supra note 57, at 188 (noting that Board damage awards in even
discriminatory discharge cases are significantly limited and delayed).
147
As Clyde Summers has suggested, the current legal framework—particularly the extent to which it allows
employers to fight unionization—is likely a significant factor in many employees’ stated preference for more voice,
but not through a traditional union. See Summers, supra note 116, at 138. Absent substantial employer hostility,
employees may prefer traditional unions to a much larger degree. Id. The proposal here addresses part of this
problem by pairing the modification of the company union prohibition with remedial changes that would increase
enforcement and penalties for employer unfair labor practices. See supra notes 136-143 and accompanying text.
148
See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 21, at 6 (describing survey result that employees typically welcome
employer-initiated employee-involvement programs, although would prefer them to give employees more authority).
149
The lack of a significant cost to this change is in relation to the current state of unionism in the U.S. See Estlund,
supra note 2, at 1547, 1550-51. It is true, of course, that the modification proposed here would allow plans that do
not necessarily represent a majority of workers and that could give employers more leeway to set up a sham
organization that only pretends to take employee input into account. See Summers, supra note 116, at 147. These
possibilities, however, will often be discernable to employees—at least eventually—which undermines their threat
to employees. Moreover, employers seeking to infringe employees’ freedom to unionize currently have many other
options, most of which are far more effective; thus, the possibility that an occasional employer will have another
weapon in its arsenal is not a significant cost. Indeed, if penalties against employers increase, it is likely that this
potential cost is vastly outweighed by the benefits of greater protection against employer interference. See supra
notes 136-143 and accompanying text.
150
Indeed, prior to the enactment of the NLRA, some company unions were recognized as providing benefits to
employees through assistance with grievances, information gathering, communication with employers, and
improving wages, benefits, and other conditions of work. See Barenberg, Democracy and Domination, supra note
72, at 849-51. Barenberg also notes that the benefits of company unions were often ultimately overshadowed by
unmet employee desires and, in the 1920s, most employers eventually discontinued their company unions; however,
he recognizes that the earlier company unions were far less collaborative than modern work groups. See id. at 86061, 875-79.
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damage traditional unionism.151 To be sure, the proposal may make organizing more difficult in
some circumstances, but much of that difficulty would arise from workers being satisfied with
the level of input they enjoy via their employer-sponsored work group. It is up to the union to
convince employees that traditional unionism would be better. Thus, in addition to providing
more employee voice, encouraging work groups would spur competition and innovation by
traditional unions and give employees a taste of collective representation—possibly resulting in a
higher level of union density.152 Indeed, the company union prohibition under the Railway
Labor Act153 (“RLA”) is narrower than the NLRB’s, yet union density is significantly higher in
industries covered by the RLA.154 The goal, however, should not be purely to bolster traditional
unionism. What is more important is that competition and complementarity between union and
nonunion vehicles of worker voice are likely to pull traditional unions in a direction aimed more
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See supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
See Kye Pawlenko, Reevaluating Inter-Union Competition: A Proposal To Resurrect Rival Unionism, 8 U. PA. J.
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at value creation and less at rent appropriation.
Most workforces will remain nonunion in the current economic environment. The
choice, then, is between the status quo or more nonunion workplaces with enhanced employee
input. As evidenced by the Dunlop Commission report and subsequent literature, many
employees say they want such input.155 The highly competitive environment in which U.S. firms
operate will provide both an incentive to develop welfare-enhancing innovations in workplace
governance and a constraint on developments that transfer rents but do not add value. If welfareenhancing innovations develop, adoption could be widespread; if not, there will be little change.
Whatever the eventual effects, employer response is likely to be slow. Despite management
protestations, the extent to which current law provides an overwhelming barrier to nonunion
work groups is unclear156 and their use may be limited to a significant degree by management
reluctance to increase worker participation.157 Relaxation of the current restrictions would be a
change in the right direction, however, encouraging and publicly sanctioning participation and
cooperation in nonunion companies.158
B.

Changing the Labor Law Default

A particularly broad reform that could prompt far greater development of nontraditional
work groups than modifications to the company union ban would be to change the labor law
default from its current nonunion setting. One alternative default would be a governance
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structure with some level of independent worker voice that does not rise to the level of formal
collective bargaining—perhaps similar to Germany’s works councils.159 This default could be
waived or replaced with the express approval of employees and management.160 As is the case
for German works councils, one may want to require that the voice mechanism be activated only
in those establishments where it is requested by employees, while also exempting very small
establishments.161
At first blush, one might think that changing the default would have little effect. Labor
law’s current nonunion default allows a majority of workers to either choose union
representation or subsequently decertify a union.162 If union representation were the default, a
majority of workers could similarly decertify the union as their agent or subsequently elect a
union. This raises the question whether, in a frictionless system, employee preferences would be
unaffected by the initial default and thus lead to the same low level of private sector union
coverage seen today. The answer is no. The labor law default has a significant effect on the
resulting governance structure, even when a low cost procedure to move away from the default
exists. Shifting to a union default, for example, would lead to widespread union decertification,
but not to a steady-state private sector density as low as the current 8%.163
The default’s importance results from several factors. One reason is that the NLRA
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certification and decertification process is far from frictionless.164 More important is that
economic agents exhibit behavioral inertia, often sticking with an existing rule or environment as
long as it does not differ too much from the preferred choice.165 The default also acts as a signal
that the state or employer has deemed the default norm as appropriate.166 Further, as businesses
engage in normal turnover, there is a tendency to move toward the default; currently, older
businesses, including some that are unionized, are replaced by new businesses, which almost
always begin as nonunion.167 Many workplaces, therefore, will not change from the default
governance structure. Yet, despite these factors, changing the default rule will not act as a
mandate. Rather, the default is a starting point—or bargaining “threat point”—from which the
parties would remain free to move given mutual agreement.
We see virtue in a default that establishes some form of independent work group,
although not one with full collective bargaining rights. Workers would retain their current right
to form independent unions without management approval. The default mechanism would
specify standard procedures through which these independent work groups and management
might discuss, negotiate, and approve mutually beneficial changes. It is difficult to predict
precisely how any given system might evolve and operate, and the default will not function well
in all workplaces. We suspect that in many, if not most, workplaces, employees would not
invoke their right to engage in collective voice. In other workplaces, the employer and workers
would have incentive to move away from the default and develop proposals for participatory
welfare-enhancing governance structures, whether in the form of unions or less formal work
groups. Over time, experience with such a system will lead to administrative and legislated
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changes in the default.
The inability to identify in advance all outcomes of a given reform is not a fatal flaw.
The same can be said of any change, including the NLRA’s enactment in 1935. Moreover, laws
and regulations evolve in response to changing benefits and costs. Adoption of a new workplace
default would set off significant activity among management, workers, and workers’ agents to
communicate, negotiate, and arrive at alternatives that make the parties better off.
Such a major change in labor law obviously requires thorough analysis and careful
design. The actual working of such a system, however, would be determined in no small part by
the way it evolves in the workplace, courts, and regulatory agencies. Given the current
stagnation in the NLRA’s governance of the changing workplace, a fundamental change such as
shifting the default could provide a useful catalyst for important modifications and refinements
of labor regulation.168
C.

Conditional Deregulation

Another means to encourage the development of certain types of work groups is a
modification along the lines of David Levine’s proposed “conditional deregulation.” Under this
proposal, a subset of governmental regulations would be waived if there is consent by both the
company and an approved worker organization within the company.169 Levine recognizes that
there are a large number of governmental mandates and regulatory measures regarding
workplace safety, hours and overtime requirements, pensions, discrimination, family leave, and
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other subjects, but argues that one-size-fits-all rules are often inefficient.170 Instead, he contends
that employee involvement in enforcing these rules could significantly lower the cost of
workplace regulation.171 Although Levine’s focus is more efficient enforcement of workplace
regulations, his proposal could also expand welfare-enhancing worker voice and participation.
Under the Levine proposal, the default for nearly all firms would be the status quo—
coverage by the full extent of regulations. These regulations would be divided into waivable and
non-waivable rules, with the latter including a minimum set of standards, such as those dealing
with discrimination or safety, required of all employers.172 Conditional deregulation would
exempt employers from the waivable set of regulations and subject them only to the minimum
standards if they voluntarily adopt alternative regulatory systems with employee oversight and
approval.173 The expectation is that this form of conditional deregulation would be welfareenhancing for both workers and employers.
In order to deregulate workplace standards, firms must have in place independent worker
committees to perform the approval and oversight functions. The union and employer would
provide such authority within unionized companies.174 For nonunion employers, worker
committees, created via a certified free election process, would have authority to approve the
waiver on behalf of employees.175 Conditional deregulation would thus spur the establishment of
worker associations throughout the private sector, providing a vehicle for nonunion worker
participation and cooperation. Such groups might also be used as an instrument to transfer quasi-
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rents from shareholders to workers.176 But rent-seeking should be limited given that employers
can determine whether or not to stick with the default regulatory standard. Therefore, although
the details of any such plan are important, conditional deregulation offers an opportunity to
foster nonunion voice and provide mutual gains to workers and employers in at least some
workplaces.
D.

State and Local Labor Regulation

Changes in the national labor law default or conditional deregulation require strong
public and legislative support, neither of which look to occur imminently. Richard Freeman and
others have suggested that a more promising source for labor regulation reform—possibly
including reforms that would encourage welfare-enhancing employee voice—is state
legislation.177 The theory is that states’ successes and failures in implementing workplace
regulations would be imitated and avoided, respectively, by other states. Thus, to the extent that
states have latitude to enact labor regulations, it is possible that state capitals may become the
focal point for political action.178 Indeed, counties and municipalities already are often at the
forefront of laws affecting the workplace, including sexual orientation anti-discrimination
measures and living wage ordinances.179
Significant limits to the state and local model exist, however. The broad scope of NLRA
preemption means that many major innovations in labor regulation would be permissible only at
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the federal level.180 Accordingly, federal labor preemption must drastically change for any
significant state or local innovations in workplace governance to occur. Because labor
preemption is primarily a creation of the Supreme Court—based on its interpretation of
congressional intent—such a modification is theoretically possible without legislation.181 Yet,
the Court’s preemption jurisprudence began in earnest almost 50 years ago, and is unlikely to
suddenly shift absent legislative action.
The cost of federal preemption is that it forecloses what might otherwise be beneficial
state labor and employment law innovations. Were federal preemption relaxed, governance
innovations adopted in large states would frequently lead national firms to implement them
company-wide. Moreover, if innovations in states of any size were viewed as welfareenhancing, other states would be more likely to copy them; governance innovations that are
costly to firms or appear to provide few benefits to workers are least likely to be adopted.182
Some variation in state employment regulation should also be welfare enhancing by allowing
legal heterogeneity that reflects differences in the preferences of voters, in states’ economic
environment, and in the legitimate influence of interest groups.
Federal labor preemption, however, provides the obvious benefit of enabling employers
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with establishments in more than one state to operate under the same legal regime.183 Variations
in state regulations may produce other negative effects as well. For example, politicians in some
states may be overly sensitive to business interests and the location of new plants, thereby
adopting labor and employment laws that may not be welfare enhancing.184 Politicians in other
states may produce a set of labor and employment laws that are overly beneficial to incumbent
workers, which may discourage new plants and job growth.
In the end, the attractiveness of greater state and local flexibility depends on numerous
factors that are difficult to assess. Heterogeneity in states’ and localities’ underlying preferences
and economic environments makes heterogeneity in the law more attractive. Lack of uniformity
in the law has a cost, however, particularly in a dynamic economy with considerable interstate
(and international) commerce. Legal experimentation and innovation can provide many of the
same benefits as does competition in the private economy. But the link is not nearly so clear-cut.
Many reasonable persons will prefer to put all their eggs in a single basket of federal labor
regulation than in the many baskets of various state labor laws. A more nuanced analysis, one
beyond the scope of this paper, would identify the specific forms of labor and employment
regulation that might best operate at the federal level, and those for which state and local
heterogeneity would be most beneficial.
Regardless of one’s view of the attractiveness of state and local innovation in workplace
governance, a move in that direction faces considerable political, legal, and economic barriers.185
Accordingly, we believe that greater state and local labor regulation may expand welfare-

183

See, e.g., Erik Schelzig, FedEx’s Smith Warns of Regulating, MEMPHIS COMM. APPEAL (Aug. 16, 2006), at C2
(quoting FedEx chairman warning conference of state legislatures that additional state regulation can drive business
away because “commerce today is not local in virtually any respect”).
184
This is a variant of the argument that states will “race to the bottom.”
185
To varying degrees, much the same can be said for other reforms analyzed in this Article.

45

enhancing worker voice and participation in certain geographic areas, but is not a particularly
promising avenue for the country as a whole.186
E.

The Internet

The promotion of employee voice and participation also requires labor regulations that
ensure employees’ freedom to use electronic communications to converse with each other about
workplace concerns. Email, weblogs, and websites, which we refer to simply as the “Internet,”
have sharply lowered communication costs and are changing the way in which people interact.
This change is highly significant for the workplace, as the Internet has become a vital tool for a
wide variety of entities such as unions, companies, employees, work groups, and policy
advocates. Employees’ use of the Internet at work—from communications made while at the
worksite to work done exclusively as a telecommuter—has continued to grow drastically. In the
October 2003 supplement to the Current Population Survey, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(“BLS”) estimated that 55% of all employees used a computer at work and that 42% used the
Internet, although computer use varies substantially with respect to occupation, industry, and
education.187 The Board, even as early as 1993, recognized that at some worksites, email had
“become an important, if not essential, means of communication.”188 That description is far
more apt today.
The low cost of electronic communications has made it particularly valuable to unions
and other groups attempting to organize employees because they provide an affordable means to
186

The appeal of state labor reform to Freeman and other scholars may stem less from their optimism about the
promise of state reforms than from a strong pessimism regarding the possibility or direction of federal reforms.
187
See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE AT WORK IN 2003 2, Table
A (2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ciuaw.pdf; see also Joan T. A. Gabel & Nancy
Mansfield, On the Increasing Presence of Remote Employees: An Analysis of the Internet’s Impact on Employment
Law as it Relates to Teleworkers, 2001 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 233, 235 (2001) (discussing rise in teleworkers).
Email is not the only popular form of electronic communication for employees; one survey found that 35% of
employees used instant messaging at work. See Survey Finds More Employer Policies Focus on Employees’ Email
than IM, Blogs, 137 DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA), July 18, 2006, at A-8.
188
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 919 (1993).

46

reach many employees, especially at small and widely dispersed job sites.189 However, given the
low rate of private sector unionism, most employees’ use of the Internet for collective action
takes place in firms that are nonunion. The Internet provides nonunion firms interested in
promoting employee voice and cooperation an additional, low-cost means of communicating
with their employees. Use of the Internet is not without legal risk, however. Although to a far
lesser extent than Internet usage by outside organizers or work groups,190 employees’ freedom to
use electronic communications to discuss work issues among themselves or with their employer
faces possible hurdles under the NLRA.
A threshold issue involving employee Internet use is the extent to which electronic
communications are treated as concerted activity that is protected by the NLRA.191 The question
is important given that, in many workplaces, a significant amount of employee interactions occur
electronically.192 Even where these interactions involve discussions and cooperation with an
employer, employees must have the freedom to talk among themselves without fear of employer
interference. Indeed, whatever value may inure to the employer or employees from enhanced
189

See U-Haul Co. of Cal., 347 N.L.R.B. No. 34, 17 (June 8, 2006) (describing employee organizing drive started by
downloading information from union website and distributing it to other employees); Frontier Tel. of Rochester,
Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. No. 153, 8, 10-11 (2006) (finding that employer unlawfully terminated employee who, among
other union activity, created a Yahoo! webpage to encourage discussions among employees during organizing
campaign), enforced, 2006 WL 1359938 (2d Cir. May 16, 2006) (Table); Freeman, Web, supra note 74, at 2, 10-11
(noting that all international unions, and thousands of local unions have websites and describing AFL-CIO’s
“Working Families Network,” which has over two million email addresses of union “eActivists”).
190
Nonemployee organizers’ ability to use an employers’ Internet system raises several important issues that are
beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on maximizing employee voice and workplace cooperation in an
economy where the dominant form of workplace governance is based on nonunion, managerial discretion. These
issues include whether organizers’ unauthorized use of an employer’s electronic communications system is treated
the same as organizers’ unauthorized activity on an employer’s real property. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502
U.S. 527, 533 (1992) (holding that employer can exclude organizers from its property in a nondiscriminatory
manner if reasonable alternatives to contacting employees exist); Hirsch, Property Rights, supra note 180
(discussing Lechmere and proposing new Board analysis for nonemployee right to access cases).
191
Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in Cyberspace: Union Organizing in
Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (citing Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 248-50
(1997) (concluding that employee’s email criticism of vacation benefits was protected under the Act); E. I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 897 (1993) (finding that employer unlawfully barred union literature from
company email system)).
192
See supra note 187; Elena N. Broder, Note, (Net)workers’ Rights: The NLRA and Employee Electronic
Communications, 105 Yale L.J. 1639, 1657 (1996).

47

employee voice is dependent on a free flow of information. If employees fear that their
comments, suggestions, or requests will result in adverse employment actions, they are unlikely
to participate in meaningful workplace communications. Having an independent third party—
the NLRB—guarantee and protect employees’ right to communicate without undue employer
interference could be an important safeguard that helps to foster workplace participation.
The potential for employers to react negatively to employee comments is not far-fetched.
Lower-level supervisors and managers, in particular, may be more concerned with their personal
interests than that of the firm as a whole.193 Yet, the performance of these supervisors and
managers is likely to be an important piece of information that employees possess and employers
want.194 It is exactly this type of knowledge that can provide significant benefits for workplace
cooperation programs—but only if employees believe that they can provide the information
without suffering adverse actions. The NLRA is well-suited to safeguard employees in such
situations.195
Section 7 of the NLRA protects most employee activity that is concerted—that is, activity
that seeks to promote or protect employees’ collective workplace interests.196 Thus, an employer
generally may not engage in any activity that reasonably tends to make employees feel that their
193
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right to engage in concerted activity is chilled. Typically, Internet usage is considered the same
as any other traditional, concerted and protected communication.197 This approach makes sense,
for the means of communications has little or no effect on whether an activity is considered
concerted and protected under Section 7. The Internet merely serves as a resource to engage in
this type of activity and the Board appropriately treats it as such.198
Because a Section 8(a)(1) violation requires only a “reasonable tendency” to interfere
with employees’ freedom to engage in protected activity, no matter the motive,199 employers
must ensure that they not retaliate, even unintentionally, against employees’ electronic
communications. An employer that encourages employee participation should make clear to
employees that they are generally free to communicate with each other and with the employer
without facing negative consequences. Punishing an employee for even a highly critical email
would not only chill employees’ willingness to fully participate in workplace discussions, but
likely violate Section 8(a)(1) as well.200
Employees must also be wary. Complications exist when, as is common, employees use
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employer-provided Internet services. An employer’s interests in the operation of its Internet
system may alter the typical Section 7 balancing test between employee rights and employer
interests, and that shift may be dispositive in determining whether employee activity on an
employer’s system is protected.201 Under this balance, an employee’s concerted and otherwise
protected action will lose Section 7 protection if it unreasonably interferes with the employer’s
business interests. For example, in Washington Adventist Hospital, Inc.,202 the Board found that
a nonunion employee’s email critical of its employer was not protected by the Act because it
automatically appeared on all computers and required a user to delete the message to remove it
from the screen.203 According to the Board, this email interrupted employees’ work during a
busy time and took over the system as medical information was being entered.204 Although a
similar message that lacked such an effect would generally be protected,205 the Board will likely
continue to find that emails causing disruptions to the extent of what occurred in Washington
Adventist are excessive. The result is that employees must be careful in how they use their
employer’s Internet system.
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Another issue centers on whether employer’s surveillance of employees’ electronic
communications—or the creation of an impression of such surveillance—may unlawfully chill
employees’ ability to engage in meaningful discussions with one another about workplace issues.
In particular, the monitoring of employees’ Internet use, which many employers now do as a
routine matter,206 may constitute unlawful surveillance if some of those communications involve
subjects related to protected activity.207 Employees participating in an employer-sponsored work
group are susceptible to this risk, as they are likely to be in contact with other employees to
discuss their views on workplace matters. If the employer monitors emails, a reasonable
employee is likely to feel hesitant about criticizing her employer or supervisor. That chilling
effect could undermine the value of workplace participation programs and violate the Act.
The Board’s well-established surveillance law seeks to minimize the chilling effect on
protected conduct by reducing the risk that employees believe that their employer is taking
special efforts to monitor their collective activity.208 Thus, absent sufficient justification, an
employer violates the NLRA by observing employees engaged in protected activity or making an
impression that they are engaging in such observations.209 Sufficient justification for
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surveillance exists where an employer can show the existence of a reasonable threat of violence
or other misconduct that would affect the employer’s business.210
The key issue regarding an employer’s monitoring of electronic communications is
whether a sufficient business justification exists. This inquiry should depend on whether the
employer’s monitoring resembles a program that merely screens electronic communications for
certain words or other indications of improper usage (e.g., pornography), or the monitoring
regularly reports the content of communications or the identities of employees using the Internet.
Both circumstances could reasonably lead employees to believe that the employer is monitoring
their protected discussions. The latter example, however, has a far weaker business justification,
thereby failing to defend the employer’s surveillance and increasing the interference with
employees’ ability to communicate with each other without fear of retaliation. In short, an
employer should have few problems if it does not attempt to monitor specific communications
related to protected activity and does not generally monitor the substance of Internet activity.
Employers, however, must be careful not to make their observations too broad or specific.
Regardless of the NLRB’s approach to the issues of protection and surveillance of
electronic communications, the Internet will continue to play a large role in the workplace. The
NLRA, however, will have an impact on the Internet’s ability to foster collective action. That
impact will be most significant with regard to outside groups’ ability to contact workers in the
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face of employer resistance,211 but the Act does have some relevance to employer-sponsored
worker participation programs. To be sure, employers that are willing to encourage worker voice
are less likely to interfere with employees’ freedom to exercise that voice. Nevertheless, the
NLRA can protect employees’ freedom to use electronic communications while participating in
employer-sponsored cooperation programs. This protection will encourage employee voice and
cooperation that is more honest and representative of other employees’ interest, which will in
turn make workplace participation programs more useful.
CONCLUSION
Over the past 70 years, the NLRA has played an important role in the development of
private sector unionization. The NLRA’s current role has become marginalized, however,
largely failing to serve well either the small private union sector or the large nonunion sector.
This failure is most pronounced with regard to the demand for, and potential gains from, greater
workplace voice and cooperation in many nonunion workplaces. To the extent that mutual
employer and worker gains are to be realized, they will occur largely through non-mandated
employer workplace norms in nonunion establishments. Accordingly the NLRA should foster
the development of employee voice in the nonunion sector; however, the statute more frequently
acts as a hurdle than a spur to welfare-enhancing workplace communications and cooperation.
We have suggested labor and employment law reforms that might facilitate the
development of greater voice and cooperation in the nonunion private sector, while providing the
impetus for unions to create joint value and flourish in an increasingly competitive world.
Specifically, we suggest weakening the NLRA’s company union prohibition in a manner that
would permit more employer-supported work groups, as they will often serve as the best option
for employee voice in the largely nonunion private sector. Other possible reforms include
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changing the nonunion labor law default, allowing for conditional deregulation that encourages
the development of independent workers councils as a substitute for governmental mandates, and
greater experimentation and competition in state and local labor regulations. Finally, labor law
should recognize the lower costs of communication and coordination associated with the
Internet, encouraging its use to enhance workplace voice and participation.
Unfortunately, the most likely prospect for the near future is the absence of significant
policy innovations. With or without major changes, however, evolutionary transformation in the
workplace will continue as economic agents react to changing opportunities and constraints.
Rather than relying on a labor law regime designed for a different era, or increasing the use of
federal “one-size fits all” labor regulations, there exists a better way. Employment and labor law
reforms that encourage and facilitate the evolution and development of nonunion workplace
voice and cooperation can best satisfy the diverse needs of workers, employers, and society in
the modern economy.
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